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Abstract
We critically review the methodological practices of two research programs which are jointly
called ‘neuroeconomics’. We defend the first of these, termed ‘neurocellular economics’
(NE) by Ross (2008), from an attack on its relevance by Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) (GP).
This attack arbitrarily singles out some but not all processing variables as unimportant to
economics, is insensitive to the realities of empirical theory testing, and ignores the central
importance to economics of ‘ecological rationality’ (Smith 2007). GP ironically share this
last attitude with advocates of ‘behavioral economics in the scanner’ (BES), the other, and
better known, branch of neuroeconomics. We consider grounds for skepticism about the
accomplishments of this research program to date, based on its methodological
individualism, its ad hoc econometrics, its tolerance for invalid reverse inference, and its
inattention to the difficulties involved in extracting temporally lagged data if people’s
anticipation of reward causes pre-emptive blood flow.
Keywords: neuroeconomics, Gul and Pesendorfer, ecological rationality, neurocellular
economics, MacGyver econometrics, reverse inference, pre-emptive blood flow
JEL codes: A12, B41, C51, C81, C91, D03, D87
Neuroeconomics has arisen quickly as a subfield within economics, but does not exhibit a
unified methodology. The general distinction we find most useful is between what Ross
(2008) calls “neurocellular economics” (NE) and “behavioral economics in the scanner”
(BES). We organize our critical assessment below in terms of these methodologies. Although
we are generally skeptical about BES, our identification of problems with NE that need
more attention are intended constructively.
1. The Methodological Backlash Against Neuroeconomics
Starting about 1870, a dominant methodological trend in economic theory was the
progressive severance of direct psychological commitments. This process involved three
principal milestones:



1

The generalization of all forms of value by reference to an abstract concept of utility.
The recognition that convexity of demand need not be grounded in a psychological
principle of diminishing marginal satisfaction, but could be derived from anodyne
assumptions about substitutability and budget constraints.



The popularity of revealed preference theory, which is ironically about the elimination
of preferences, conceived as latent states of mind, in favor of attention to the logical
consistency of observable choices.

In light of this history, it would be surprising if most economists were prepared to
incautiously swallow the suggestion that we can do better economics by examining people’s
brains. And so it is not surprising that the appearance of several brash and sometimes
messianic1 research programs trading under the banner of “neuroeconomics” has begun to
provoke a backlash. Harrison (2008) and Bernheim (2009) both concede possible, albeit
modest, potential contributions that brain studies could offer to economics. Gul and
Pesendorfer (2008) (GP) concede nothing at all; they thereby usefully define an extreme limit
point with respect to the economist’s assessment of neuroeconomics, against which less
uncompromising positions can be efficiently developed. We confine attention here to
selected aspects of GP’s critique that set up general points we make later.
According to GP, psychological hypotheses and empirical findings might usefully “inspire”
economists’ hypotheses, but economic models should include only variables that condition
what an agent chooses and none that condition how an agent chooses. This is because the task
of positive economics is to predict choices as functions of changes in incentives and
opportunity sets. GP do not derive this claim from transcendental insight into the true
domain of economics. Rather, they believe it to be a sociological fact that most economists
are not professionally concerned with variables for psychological processes, and will
continue to maintain this attitude because the generalizations they seek about the influences
of incentives and opportunities on choices are not sensitive to differences in such variables.
GP presumably do not think that choices are structureless Sartrean actes. They no doubt
suppose that they are computational processes of some sort, conditioned on underlying
valuations (which may themselves have resulted from prior choices). Their claim is that the
economist does and should leave the processing details inside black boxes. This implies the
view that a model that relates valuations and opportunities to outputs of choice processes is
a description of a class of computations in reduced form. Harrison (2008) points out that
GP’s examples imply a suggestion that all economic models should be exclusively given in
reduced form, and should never be structural. This, he observes, is something one could
only imagine at great theoretical distance from the actual testing of models against empirical
evidence, particularly experimental evidence. As the cost of computing power has fallen,
structural models have become increasingly common in all areas of economics except the
most airless reaches of theory; this has in turn driven a surge of innovation in econometric
techniques. An argument based on economists’ practice rather than on dogma about its
‘rightful’ domain cannot ignore this. Economics departments certainly don’t let their
graduate students ignore it.
In fact, GP allow that economic models should include variables that constrain opportunity
sets, such as interest rates. An interest rate is a kind of processing state variable, describing
1

Witness the readiness of some neuroeconomists to blithely draw revolutionary conclusions
from small neuroimaging studies. For example, Knutson et al (2007) consider fMRI data
from 26 subjects choosing purchases, and on this basis announce that economists have been
mistaken in modeling consumers as minimizing opportunity costs.
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trajectories of expected future transactions, but which aggregates the choices of many agents.
What GP consider alien to economics about neural (and other psychological) processing
states, therefore, must not be that they are processing states, but that they are internal to the
agent. The black box that the economist is specially forbidden to open is in fact the skull
cavity.
Proposed as a general principle, this is a mere prejudice. In particular, it offers no sound
basis for denying the validity of the NE branch of neuroeconomics. This program is
identified with Glimcher (2003) and colleagues, and uses the technical resources of economic
theory to understand the mechanisms by which brains comparatively evaluate alternative
possible states that share no common dimensions describable in terms of sensory modalities
or neurochemical response profiles. Glimcher (2009) calls this “subjective value,” though we
suggest that “value in the brain” would invite fewer misinterpretations. The program’s
viability and potential importance rest on an empirical hypothesis that dopamine signals in
the ventral striatum and medial prefrontal cortex constitute a “common currency” of reward
that has many properties in common with the mainstream economist’s concept of utility. If
this hypothesis is correct, then neuroscientists might usefully exploit a century’s progress by
economists in studying utility to model valuation in the brain.
We see no reason why any economist, however sure they might be that psychological
variables aren’t relevant to studying the traditional domain of economics, should resent the
borrowing of economic theory to model other domains. No one, for example, argues for
baning ecologists from using cost-benefit analysis. Of course, one might follow up this point
by asking why, if economic theory should turn out to be the main modeling technology for
the neural reward circuit, this shouldn’t lead us to say that the domain of economics had
been widened.2 But this “issue” looks entirely semantic.
A different way in which some theorists have aimed to carry economics “inside” the
individual was pioneered by Strotz (1955-56), Schelling (1978, 1980, 1984) and Ainslie
(1992), and has been refined in contributions by Benabou and Tirole (2004), Benhabib and
Bisin (2004) and Fudenberg and Levine (2006). All of this work involves explaining
behavioral patterns in individual people as equilibria of games amongst sub-personal agents,
which might or might not be identified with functional modules of brains, such as those
suggested by McClure et al (2004). Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) develop the details of a
modeling framework that is explicitly intended to capture the main phenomena which
interest the “multiple self” tradition (procrastination, addiction, and other forms of
intertemporal irresolution) without positing any sub-personal agents. Thus, whatever view
one might take of the comparative merits of these approaches, one cannot in this instance
accuse GP of resting their negative case on arbitrary restrictiveness about what economists
should and shouldn’t get up to. Note that Glimcher (2009) also explicitly rejects multipleselves models, at least insofar as the sub-personal selves in question are identified with neural
modules.
We refrain from declaring for one of the dogs in this fight. Empirical data on the dynamics
of intertemporal consumption are not yet sufficiently rich to favor any one model over its
alternatives. Instead, we note an irony in this debate: the fact that GP make a methodological
2
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This is the attitude of Ross (2005), Ross et al (2008), and Caplin and Dean (2008).

fetish out of choice at the level of the individual personal agent renders them bedfellows of
precisely the BES school of neureoconomics they attack. BES consists in repeating protocols
that putatively demonstrate human “irrationality” under neuroimaging, and trying to show
how “anomalies” in rational choice have their origins and explanations in framing effects
that result from the computational processing architecture of the brain. These behavioral
economists strike the attitude of rebels against “mainstream” or “neoclassical” economics
and revealed preference analysis, and promote neuroeconomics as a core part of the
alternative program. Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005) provide a useful survey of
work in this area, unfortunately presented as if it constituted the whole of neuroeconomics.
We share the skepticism of GP about BES. But we believe that a stubborn refusal to think
about the processes that support relationships among incentives, opportunities and choices
is a self-defeating way of promoting this skepticism. It concedes to the advocate of BES that
what economics is fundamentally about are individual people arriving at and applying
valuations all by themselves. This ignores what Smith (2007) refers to as the ecological nature of
economic rationality. Ecological rationality emphasizes the extent to which people
approximate consistent, “old-fashioned” economic rationality, not because of computational
marvels they achieve with their raw brains, but by means of what the philosopher Clark
(1997), following Hutchins (1995), calls cognitive “scaffolding.” This consists of external
structures in the environment that encode culturally accumulated information and constrain
and channel behavior. Economists are familiar with social scaffolding under the label of
“institutions.”
Our point here is not that economists have been citing Clark or Hutchins, or generally
appreciate the full power of their conceptual contributions. Philosophers might have been
expected to notice the connection, but we speculate that they have largely missed it because
economists’ examples of institutions are typically official entities with proper names, such as
the Federal Reserve, or explicit legal structures, rather than the ubiquitous and informal
guideposts to cultural practice and coordination that Clark and Hutchins emphasize.
However, we can see no conceptual distance at all between scaffolding and Smith’s
‘ecological rationality’; Wilcox (2008) makes the same point.
Ecological rationality is at the centre of some of the most discussed and cited recent work in
applied economics. For example, Gode and Sunder (1993) model the behavior of simulated
agents with “zero intelligence” that simply follow the rules of a double auction experiment
subject to budget constraints. That is, sellers do not offer to sell for more than their marginal
cost, and buyers do not offer to buy for more than their maximum willingness to pay;
otherwise, they bid randomly, constrained in the other direction only by some reasonable
upper bound or by zero. The efficiency of these simulated markets parallels that achieved by
human subjects, suggesting that the efficiency of the outcomes results from the ecological
rationality of the institutional rules, rather than relying on deliberatively and individually
rational agents. Sunder (2003) discusses generalizations of this striking result, and a broader
range of applications in economics.
To illustrate the contrast between ecological and naively individualistic rationality, imagine an
investor deciding how often she should churn her portfolio. One might first imagine her
modeling the financial market, including a representative agent with rational expectations.
This agent gathers time-indexed data on prices and returns, and calculates an average churn
rate, variance and signal-response rule from which to construct a policy that maximizes her
4

expected lifetime earnings. Though this is how economists might aim to discover the
investor’s policy, they know this does not describe the approach of the actual, typical person.
What she does instead is exploit the fact that she operates within a network of public,
normative signals. The transaction fees charged by licensed brokers vary within narrow
ranges. These ranges systematically co-vary with volatility in asset prices, dividend rates, and
opportunity costs of investments in the assets in which the brokers traffic. Our agent might,
in ignorance, begin by suffering abuse at the hands of her broker and churning too much.
Fortunately, her environment is likely to be full of signals, including institutionally encoded
second-order signals about the relative reliability of various first-order signals, that provide
her with a good chance of discovering this. She might over-react and for a time churn too
little. But she also may have access to signals about the earnings of other people whose
situations are similar to hers. If they consistently do better than she does, it may occur to her
that when her new broker tells her that she is holding assets for too long, this one might not
be trying to exploit her. Ultimately, our agent’s behavioral transaction rate might range close
to what the economist formally modeling her situation would recommend.
We can imagine a psychologist studying the investor in detail over the course of years and
predicting her specific behavior more exactly than is possible using the economist’s “as if”
approach. If all investors were psychologically identical this might be considered grounds for
disinvesting in economists and using the savings to train more psychologists. But there are
persuasive grounds for thinking that psychological variance among people is such as to
defeat this argument. Each member of a set of investors might use an idiosyncratic learning
path and idiosyncratic representations to infer what counts as the same thing at a sufficiently
abstract scale of description – namely, the approximately optimal churn rate for a broad
range of asset classes and market parameters. In that case, the economists will be in a far
stronger position to predict out of sample, and to offer aggregate-scale predictions, than any
of the psychologists who have more exact models of types of processing used by
individuals.3
The moral of this simple – indeed, simplistic – example can easily be taken too far, however.
GP write as if we know, in advance of all empirical work, that psychological variation among
individuals learning a given economic relationship will have a known distribution, for which
we can exactly control in a reduced-form model. This is very often false, in which event
work of psychologists or sociologists or neuroscientists might provide relevant evidence in
any given case. More importantly, our access to evidence might be limited in such a way that
our most practical procedure is to include parameters in our models that allow the data to
help us sort a population into sub-populations, each of whose members converge on an
economically distinct solution.
Consider, as a real instead of stylized example, the very phenomenon that has motivated the
arguments between multiple-self and single-self models of intertemporal consumption,
namely, intertemporal discounting. Begin by imagining two limiting cases. In Case 1 each
3

We are not suggesting here that psychologists aren’t interested in properties shared across
individuals. The point is merely that classifying phenomena by reference to processing
variables will generally produce a different partitioning of states and events than classifying
them by reference to economic response functions, and in the particular case we are
imagining the psychologist’s partition will be of finer grain than the economist’s.
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agent draws a discounting function from a random distribution of mathematically possible
forms, but all agents are financially punished by their market institutions to the extent that
they depart from exponential discounting at a common rate x. Psychologically, these agents
are perfectly idiosyncratic. In Case 2 all agents discount identically, but in a way that causes
them all to manifest systematic intertemporal preference reversals. GP write as if Case 1
were standard. Here, so far as economic prediction is concerned, psychological processing
variables are pure noise. Advocates of BES prefer a methodology that assumes Case 2 to be
the norm. These agents evidently face some barrier against learning to create institutional
scaffolding that could help them to act more consistently. Perhaps it is their recalcitrant
brains that get in their way.
Recent empirical work has shed considerable light on reality with respect to this example.
Hypotheses resembling both limiting case have been cleanly rejected. When we study
discounting behavior, or any choice process, we have to worry about whether any given
agent uses more than one model or ‘data generating process’ in different domains (Harrison
and Rutström (2009); Coller et al. (2009)). When we model any behavioral function in
economics we have to account systematically for the individual heterogeneity that we expect
a priori from preferences, but which demand formal econometric methods and large sample
sizes (Harrison at al. (2002); Harrison and Rutström (2008)). We have learned that
discounting in real populations is better described by structural models which allow
representation of heterogeneity with respect to curvature of utility functions and with respect
to discount rates, than by models that impose a common reduced functional form on
everyone. And we also know that exponential discounting usually predominates over
hyperbolic discounting, contrary to a common dogma of behavioral economics (Andersen
et al. (2008)).
Thus the most empirically robust and informative models of discounting and related
behaviors include some processing variables, but only as many as are needed to allow us to
estimate a limited set of parameters from data. The process of discovery of these models is
economics, not psychology, because it does not discriminate between different hypotheses
that would be of major concern to a psychologist. Do majorities of human populations
converge on exponential discounting because their brains are naturally disposed to it, or
because the social ecologies in which they are immersed train them to do so and induce
them to collectively build institutional scaffolding that helps them to keep on track?
Notice that if one were doing psychology, and were investigating the question just posed, one
thing one might want to do is wrench subjects out of their scaffolded environments. One way
to do this would involve putting them in strange laboratories performing socially novel tasks;
or, possibly, to disorient them still more, by making them lie down with their heads in
magnets. We could then see if they discounted in ways their public norms would deem
confused. There is a non-arbitrary reason to say one is doing psychology rather than
economics here: in the context of their natural, culturally-evolved, economies, most of the
subjects will not behave this way. This points to a respect in which economics is not merely
methodologically autonomous with respect to neuroscience: economic regularities, understood
as ecological properties of a certain kind, can causally dominate neural processing properties
that would prevail in a brain forced to fend for itself.

6

2. The Empirical Methodology of Neuroeconomics
One of the basic historical divides between psychologists and economists has been the
reluctance of the latter to embrace latent variables in their modeling. In discussions by both
psychologists and economists, along with philosophers, of methodologies for modeling
choices of individuals, it is often taken for granted that the only grounds for abstemiousness
must be residual behaviorism on the part of the economists. We think that a judicious dash
of behaviorism is well advised (Ross (2005)), but let us put that aside here. Even economists
who are convinced by the fashionable claim that behaviorism is a wholly pernicious doctrine
should recognize that introducing latent variables must necessarily involve them in an issue
around the nature of ‘constructs’ which their usual methods allow them to avoid.
The issue in question is the distinction between ‘reflective’ and ‘formative’ constructs. The
former are diagnosed or indicated by sets of observable markers which are each supposed to
perfectly reflect a single underlying latent variable. Such constructs are based on factor
analysis, used to discover high-loading items and reject low-loading ones, rather than on
structural modeling. Formative constructs, by contrast, have the logical character of
dependent variables in economic models. That is, they summarize the interactions of a range
of independent (perhaps causally linked) variables. Consider, for example, the construct
‘addiction’. A reflective version of this construct would include behavioural tendencies, each
of which is taken to indicate the underlying latent condition. In classifying addicts, it is
inappropriate to sum the items in the reflective construct, since displaying more reflective
items is not associated with being more severely addicted. By contrast, a formative
‘addiction’ construct would list variables that are taken to structurally constitute addiction.
Structural, possibly causal, relationships among these variables are expected to track the
extent to which a person is addicted. In the context of research on pathological gambling,
which is methodologically representative of much psychological work on clinical conditions,
Schellinck and Schrans (2008) complain of a pervasive confusion between reflective and
formative constructs, with the former often being borrowed from diagnostic practice when it
is the latter that are needed for scientific discovery because they are the basic coin of new
generalizations.
This issue doesn’t arise for economists, for two reasons. First, their unobservable
explanatory variables are often axiomatized by reference to behavioral conditions. Caplin
(2008) has drawn attention to the potential value of this for neuroeconomics, and Caplin and
Dean (2008) have begun to do something about it. More prosaically, however, the use of
standard econometric techniques forces economists to work as if all of their lists of
independent variables are formative constructs, because distinct variables in models must
not, for the sake of statistical testing, be perfectly correlated with one another. This tends to
have the effect of making it hard to find models that both fit wide ranges of data and are
econometrically tractable. Though this has sometimes been a subject for complaint, we think
it has had a salutary influence on economics. For one thing, it has forced a steady
improvement in the depth and sophistication of econometric techniques and theory. This is
a good reason why neuroeconomists should wish to remain economists.
They cannot have it both ways, however. If maintenance of modeling discipline
recommends the economists’ club when key target variables are unobservable as, we will
argue, they are in neuroeconomics (fMRI nothwithstanding), then econometric restrictions
must be treated seriously. We do not generally find this in BES, however, and we have an
7

hypothesis as to why not: fMRI data are frequently treated as if they were first-order
observations rather than products of chains of statistical inference. We illustrate this general
point with three types of methodological problems that have arisen in recent empirical
neuroscience and neuroeconomics.
2.1 Data Versus Estimates
The unit of neuroeconomic analysis is a spatial location in the brain emitting signals per unit
of time. So in a neuroeconomist’s typical fMRI data set a few brains contribute many
observations at each point in time, and in a time-series. Therefore, statistical issues arise
both for inferences about single brains, and for inferences about pooled samples of brains.
To understand the significance of the former, one need only review the typical list of
estimation methods employed; for example, see Rabe-Hesketh et al (1997, pp. 217-226). The
inferential problem here is simply that point estimates from one stage are taken as data in the
next stage, and then there is a long chain of such inferences. The implication is that the
standard errors of estimates at later stages tend to overstate the precision of estimations, and
later estimates may be completely inconsistent.4 This is compounded by the inferential can of
worms involved in pooling across brains. There are many different ways to normalize brains,
as one can imagine and hope, and these matter for inference.5
The end result is that the statistical modeling of neural data is a sequential mixture of
limited-information likelihood methods, frequently cobbled together by ad hoc methods:
“MacGyver econometrics,” to borrow the label of Harrison (2008). Recognizing this fact is
not meant as a way of invalidating the clinical or research goals of such exercises, but as a
reminder of the extremely limited extent to which modeling and estimation errors are likely
to be correctly propagated throughout the chains of inferences based on fMRI data. The end
result is often a statistical test in which left hand side and right hand side variables are
themselves estimates, often from a long chain of estimates, and are treated as if they are firstorder data. This encourages significant understatement of standard errors on estimates of
effects, implying significant overstatement of statistically significant differential activation.
Consider an example of this problem from Glimcher, Kable and Louie (2007). In one
instance a correlation is calculated that refers to an econometrically estimated discounted
utility function from standard behavioral data. The parameters of this function have standard
errors when estimated. But when used to predict activity of the brain, when used as a righthand-side correlate, the standard errors disappear:
These individually measured indifference curves permitted us, for each
subject, to model the discounted utility of each delayed option presented to
our subjects in the brain scanner. With this behavioral measurement in hand,
we could then ask whether any activity in the brain of these subjects was
correlated with the discounted utility of an option under consideration. We
found that, in each of our subjects, the activity of the brain in three areas
typically associated with option valuation [...] showed a clear correlation with
this behaviorally derived function. Put another way, brain activity measured
4

This point has been made in the neuroscience literature by Vul, Harris, Winkielman and
Pashler (2009), and in a critique of the neuroeconomics literature by Harrison (2008).
5
Harrison (2008, p. 312ff) provides references to the literature.
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in [three areas] … had many of the properties of that subject’s discounted
utility function (p. 143).
We flag this problem precisely because we are partial to the authors’ underlying algorithmic
hypotheses about discounting behavior. It is most important to be critical of stories one
finds most plausible, since others can be counted on for the rest.
2.2 Reverse inference
The other general problem is related, and is known in the literature as the reverse inference
problem. This arises when activations in regions of the brain are presumed to identify the
activation of a (labelled) cognitive process. Poldrack (2006) explains the process well, and
provides some well-cited illustrations of the extent of the problem.
There is much debate in neuroscience about the selectivity of cognitive processes.
D’Esposito et al (1998) give an early discussion of the reverse inference problem in this
context. They “conclude that human lateral prefontal cortex supports processes in addition
to working memory. Thus, reverse inference of the form ‘if prefontal cortex is active,
working memory is engaged’ is not supported” (p. 274). Claims of this sort are subject to
debate and, of course, refinement through different designs, instrumentation and methods of
statistical inference. It is not hard to find such debates in neuroscience, but they tend to be
glossed in the very neuroeconomics work that should be using the sophisticated modelling
strategies of economics to develop tests of them.
Kahneman (2009, pp. 523-524) provides insight into the tendency in the neuroeconomics
literature to avoid discussing awkward statistical issues, such as those posed by the reverse
inference problem. He reflects on the problem that researchers face, in exactly the way that
is relevant for the accumulation of knowledge in this area, when one must evaluate a favored
story:
High correlations between well-identified psychological and neural measures
are the exception, not the norm. In most experiments … the correspondence
between psychological terms and neural measures is more equivocal, and the
interpretation of imaging results is tricky. Poldrack […] has drawn attention
to the problem of "reverse inference," which arises when people infer a
specific a psychological process from activity in a particular region -- for
example, when activity in dorsal striatum is interpreted as an indication that
people enjoy punishing strangers who have behaved unfairly […]. There is
indeed a problem, because activity in dorsal striatum is not perfectly
correlated with enjoyment: many other circumstances produce activity in that
region, and there is no assurance that it will be active whenever the individual
experiences pleasure. In spite of this difficulty, the result and its proposed
interpretation is just what a general psychologist (not a neuroscience
specialist) would order. It is surprising but plausible, and it drives thinking in
new directions. The more difficult test, for a general psychologist, is to
remember that the new idea is still a hypothesis which has passed only a
rather low standard of proof. I know the test is difficult, because I fail it: I
believe the interpretation, and do not label it with an asterisk when I think
about it. And I will be sorry if it is disproved, but will have no difficulty in
9

accepting its demise -- it would join a long list of defunct once-cherished
ideas.
An example of a neuroeconomist acknowledging the importance of the problem is Phelps
(2009, pp.245-247). She points out that the amygdala and the insular cortex, two regions
often flagged as “proving” that emotions play a role in economic decision-making have been
identified as playing other, arguably non-emotional roles. She correctly concludes (p. 247)
that “[a]lthough reverse inference is a powerful technique for generating hypotheses and
ideas that inspire additional studies or measurements, its use as a primary technique for
determining a role for the emotions is questionable.” In light of this, we don’t quite see what
licenses her general conclusion about the role of neuroscience in demonstrating an empirical
role for emotions in economic decision-making: “Although emotion was considered an
important variable in economic decision making prior to neuroeconomics […], the recent
growth in this field has highlighted a role for emotion in economic choice.” (p.234). We do
not quarrel with the highly plausible conclusion. We simply can’t find new evidence for it
coming from neuroeconomics, even in a careful survey precisely intended to summarize that
contribution.
The problem afflicts BES to a greater extent than it does NE, partly because the former is
more reliant on fMRI work with humans whereas the empirical foundations of the latter lie
in single-cell recordings in rats and monkeys. Indeed, we find a nice example of leading NE
researchers invoking the problem against a frequently cited flagship BES result. Glimcher
(2009, pp. 518-519) criticizes the claim of McClure et al (2004) that an identifiable part of the
brain implements the β part of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model and another part of
the brain implements the δ part of that model. He initially questions the anatomical viability
of the proposed localization of brain activity, and the lack of correspondence to well-studied
animal data. But his most telling criticism is that two of the regions that have been identified
as being associated with "emotional" decision-making in these particular tests, the basal
ganglia and the medial prefrontal cortex, have also been shown by others to be associated
with traditionally “rational” functions such as the encoding of monetary and primary
rewards, and the expression of ordinal preference.
2.3 Sorting Out Shadows
Another issue of significance in recent debate over the use of fMRI imaging is the problem
of “pre-emptive blood flow” identified by Sirotin and Das (2009) and summarized by
Leopold (2009). The phenomenon was detected by independently and directly measuring
blood flow and neural activity in monkeys. The inferential problem arises if there is blood
flow activity in anticipation of some event even if the event does not occur. Some mismatch
between blood flow and neural activity is expected, but the difference here is several orders
of magnitude beyond the customary. One conjecture is that this is a type of “priming”
activity in the brain, so that blood is ready and available in the expectation that it will be
used. But since the temporal connection between stimulus and response lies at the heart of
almost all neuroeconomic methods, this finding is extremely troublesome. It is particularly
likely to be a problem for neuroscientific research involving humans, who can learn vast
networks of anticipation from their cultures.
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3. Conclusion
BES-style neuroeconomics is plagued by two problems. First, it inherits from behavioural
economics an over-emphasis on individual “inboard” choice, divorced from socially
scaffolded context, as the basic subject matter of economics. Second, statistical problems
that are debated in the neuroscience literature, and which are familiar to econometricians,
simply have to be resolved before claims of typical BES strength can be regarded as justified.
Advocates of BES cannot simply put them to one side as “footnote qualifications” while
they get on with telling interesting stories, a tendency we find in their literature.6
We reject the view that neural data are irrelevant to economics as wilfully and obstructively
isolationist. But we also reject the free-disposability view that any data is useful data until
proven otherwise, implying that we should just collect it anyway and decide later if it was
useful. That is a poor model for advancement of study in any field. We welcome NE as a
potential contributor to formal modelling of the processes by which agents make economic
decisions, though we emphasize that this project is in its infancy and depends on an
empirical hypothesis that might turn out to be wrong – that there is a common currency of
valuation in the brain. We advise neuroeconomists to remember that and why there is a
border between economics and psychology, however often they commute across it.

6

For example, see Fox and Poldrack (2009, p.166), who mention the reverse inference
problem developed so well by Poldrack (2006), but simply move on without a blink.
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